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Abstract Functional neuroimaging and electrophysiol-
ogy studies are changing our understanding of patients with
coma and related states. Some severely brain damaged
patients may show residual cortical processing in the
absence of behavioural signs of consciousness. Given these
new findings, the diagnostic errors and their potential
effects on treatment as well as concerns regarding the
negative associations intrinsic to the term vegetative state,
the European Task Force on Disorders of Consciousness
has recently proposed the more neutral and descriptive
term unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. When vegeta-
tive/unresponsive patients show minimal signs of con-
sciousness but are unable to reliably communicate the term
minimally responsive or minimally conscious state (MCS)
is used. MCS was recently subcategorized based on the
complexity of patients’ behaviours: MCS? describes high-
level behavioural responses (i.e., command following,
intelligible verbalizations or non-functional communica-
tion) and MCS- describes low-level behavioural responses
(i.e., visual pursuit, localization of noxious stimulation or
contingent behaviour such as appropriate smiling or crying
to emotional stimuli). Finally, patients who show non-
behavioural evidence of consciousness or communication
only measurable via para-clinical testing (i.e., functional
MRI, positron emission tomography, EEG or evoked
potentials) can be considered to be in a functional locked-in
syndrome. An improved assessment of brain function in
coma and related states is not only changing nosology and
medical care but also offers a better-documented diagnosis
and prognosis and helps to further identify the neural
correlates of human consciousness.
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Introduction
We will here discuss the recent advances in our under-
standing of disorders of consciousness and focus on their
clinical consequences in terms of patients’ diagnosis. This
new knowledge also permits us to better identify of the
underlying mechanisms of these disorders and redefine our
nosological distinctions needed for accurate neurological
management. Severely brain damaged patients continue to
represent major ethical challenges regarding end-of-life
issues (for a recent European survey, see [1]). This was
dramatically illustrated in Italy by the case of Eluana
Englaro, a 36-year-old woman who remained unconscious
for 17 years after a traumatic brain injury [2]. The wide-
spread use of the artificial respirator in the 1960s led to the
redefinition of death based on neurological criteria (i.e.,
brain death or irreversible coma with absent brainstem
reflexes [3]) and to the identification of pseudocoma (i.e.,
locked-in syndrome [4]). In the 1970s patients who
awakened from coma (meaning they open their eyes
spontaneously or after stimulation) but remained without
communication or behavioural signs of consciousness were
said to be in a vegetative state (VS) [5] (previously called
apallic syndrome or coma vigil). Vegetative was chosen to
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refer to the preserved vegetative (autonomous) nervous
functioning in these patients (e.g., sleep-wake rhythm,
respiration, digestion and thermoregulation). The term
persistent was added to denote that the condition remained
for more than 1 month after insult. In 1994, a retrospective
study of all published cases permitted to propose temporal
boundaries for the irreversibility of this syndrome, hence
proposing the term permanent vegetative state [6] (unfor-
tunately persistent and permanent VS share the common
abbreviation of PVS leading to unwarranted confusion). It
is to these cases that end-of-life issues of withholding and
withdrawal of life sustaining treatment (i.e., artificial
hydration and nutrition) are related [2, 8]. In 2002, the
operational criteria for minimally conscious state (initially
called minimally responsive state) were published and
recommended (albeit not yet endorsed) by the American
Academy of Neurology, separating non-communicative
vegetative patients from non-communicative patients
showing minimal behavioural signs of consciousness [9].
Emergence from the minimally conscious state was defined
by functional communication or functional use of objects.
Time for a new nosology of disorders of consciousness?
Over the last three decades, an increasing number of cli-
nicians remained uncomfortable when referring to patients
as vegetative (e.g., [10]), resulting in a number of papers
reiterating the intellectual justification of the origins and
choice of the term [5]. This resulted in last years’ intro-
duction by the European Task Force on Disorders of
Consciousness of the term unresponsive wakefulness syn-
drome [11]. Their reasons for calling these patients unre-
sponsive rather than vegetative were multiple. First, the
word vegetative has an unintended, albeit persistent, neg-
ative connotation. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
vegetative as ‘‘an organic body capable of growth and
development but devoid of sensation and thought’’ and to
vegetate as to ‘‘live a merely physical life devoid of
intellectual activity or social intercourse’’. The notion of a
vegetative nervous system dates to the 1800s when the
nervous system was divided into animalic (i.e., related to
sensory perception and voluntary motor responses) and
vegetative parts (i.e., assuring nutritional functions).
However, for many laypersons this notion has a very
pejorative undertone and incorrectly refers to these patients
as being ‘‘vegetable-like’’. A number of highly publicised
patients illustrate this point. Julia Tavalaro survived a brain
trauma and was transferred to a tertiary care centre where
she was called the vegetable for over 6 years, although she
was conscious and sensate. She later wrote her memoirs in
Look Up for Yes [12]. A recent Google search with ‘‘Terri
Schiavo’’ and ‘‘vegetable’’ returned 410,000 hits, and
‘‘Eluana Englaro’’ and ‘‘vegetable’’ gave 31,700 hits (per-
formed April 25, 2011). A number of authors and social,
political and religious groups have, hence, felt the need to
emphasize these patients’ rights to be fully regarded as
human beings (e.g., [13, 14]). Second, vegetative state for
many physicians implies cortical death and persistency
from the moment of diagnosis. This started when the New
York Times (August 5, 1968) announced the Harvard cri-
teria for brain death. In the accompanying editorial, it read:
‘‘As old as medicine is the question of what to do about the
human vegetable… Sometimes these living corpses have
survived for years… It is such cases, as well as the need for
organs to be transplanted that the Harvard faculty com-
mittee had in mind in urging that death be redefined as
irreversible coma’’ [3]. The case of Terri Schiavo also
illustrates this point, as commentators have inaccurately
referred to her condition as brain death or neocortical death
[15]. However, patients with disorders of consciousness are
not uniformly hopeless [16, 17] and increasing evidence
from clinical [18] and neuroimaging studies (e.g., [19, 20])
have shown that clinicians need to be cautious about
making strong claims concerning allegedly vegetative
patients’ consciousness. Clinical practice shows that once
stamped with the diagnosis vegetative state it frequently is
difficult to change the label, and the first signs of recovery
of consciousness are too often missed. Terry Wallis, who
made the headlines when starting to speak after being
considered vegetative for 19 years post-trauma, well
illustrates this point [21]. Subsequent analysis of his
medical files showed he actually was minimally conscious
for all those years (albeit lacking proper rehabilitation)
[22]. Hence, for over 35 years the medical community has
been unsuccessful in changing the pejorative image asso-
ciated with the words vegetative, and given the diagnostic
errors and their potential effect on the treatment and care
for these patients, physicians are now offered a more
neutral and descriptive alternative: unresponsive wakeful-
ness syndrome. It refers to these patients showing a number
of clinical signs (i.e., syndrome) of unresponsiveness (i.e.,
without response to commands) in the presence of wake-
fulness (i.e., showing eye opening).
Some vegetative/unresponsive patients will irreversibly
remain in this condition but many may evolve to a mini-
mally responsive or minimally conscious state (MCS) [23].
Since its formal definition nearly 10 years ago [9], a number
of authors have questioned the usefulness of differentiat-
ing vegetative/unresponsive from minimally responsive
patients considering both patient groups as hopelessly brain
damaged [24]. Recent studies have demonstrated that it is
important to disentangle both clinical entities as functional
neuroimaging have shown differences in residual cerebral
processing and hence, conscious perception (e.g., [20, 25–
27]), as well as differences in outcome (e.g., [28, 29]).
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However, controlled prospective studies on prognosis (and
on treatment) in large, well-described cohorts of patients
with disorders of consciousness, permitting evidence-based
decision-making are still awaited. It has been recently
proposed that the World Health Organization would rec-
ognize MCS in its International Statistical Classification of
Diseases (9th Revision, Clinical Modification; ICD-9-CM)
diagnosis codes and related Current Procedural Terminol-
ogy (CPT) medical procedure codes (maintained by the
American Medical Association) [30]. ICD codes classify
symptoms, diseases, or injuries into categories with unique
codes permitting standardized epidemiological, morbidity
and mortality studies and reimbursement and medical
decision-making. The current lack of a unique code for
MCS may encumber scientific studies, medical information
retrieval, demographic and international analyses on prev-
alence and prognosis for disorders of consciousness. In a
next step, we have proposed to subcategorize the clinically
heterogeneous MCS entity into minimally conscious PLUS
(MCS?) and MINUS (MCS-) based on the level of com-
plexity of observed behavioural responses [31]. MCS? was
defined by the presence of (a) command following,
(b) intelligible verbalization or (c) gestural or verbal yes/no
responses. In contrast, MCS- patients only show minimal
levels of behavioural interaction characterized by the
presence of non-reflex movements such as: (a) orientation
of noxious stimuli, (b) pursuit eye movements that occur in
direct response to moving or salient stimuli, (c) movements
or affective behaviors that occur appropriately in relation to
relevant environmental stimuli (such as appropriate smiling
or crying in response to the linguistic or visual content of
emotional, but not to neutral, topics or stimuli, vocalizations
or gestures that occur in direct response to the linguistic
content of questions, reaching for objects that demonstrates
a clear relationship between object location and direction of
reach, touching or holding objects in a manner that
accommodates the size and shape of the object). Future
outcome studies should assess possible differences in
prognosis, and neuroimaging studies could demonstrate the
predicted differences in cognitive capacities and underlying
functional neuroanatomy between MCS? and MCS-
subclasses.
Figure 1 shows a simplified flow chart summarising the
possible transitions from coma to brain death [3], classical
locked-in syndrome (i.e., quadriplegia and anartria with
eye-coded communication typically following brainstem
stroke [4]) or vegetative state (now also called unrespon-
sive wakefulness [11]). As said, from the latter condition,
some patients may recover non-reflex movements (i.e.,
minimally conscious state minus; MCS-) and some may
later recover more complex behaviours such as a response
to commands (i.e., minimally conscious state plus; MCS?)
[31]. The upper boundary of MCS is defined by the
recovery of communication or functional use of objects [9].
Note that not all patients will go through all transitions;
some may rapidly show good recovery while others may
remain in a chronic disorder of consciousness for months
or years. Patients who remain vegetative/unresponsive for
over 12 months following a traumatic brain injury and
3 months following non-traumatic aetiology were consid-
ered to have very small if any chance of recovery [6] but
more recent studies have been challenging these temporal
boundaries of irreversibility (e.g., [7]). Whereas the tem-
poral boundaries of irreversibility have been proposed for
vegetative/unresponsive patients, at present no such data
exist for MCS where chances of recovery are known to be
Fig. 1 Proposed nosology of
the diagnostic entities than can
be encountered following coma,
based on clinical behavioural
evaluation (in white) and based
on novel para-clinical functional
neuroimaging studies (in
grey)—see text for details
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better [28]. As we will see, the term functional locked-in
syndrome could be proposed for patients with a dissocia-
tion between extreme behavioural motor dysfunction and
the identified preserved higher cognitive functions only
measurable by functional imaging techniques.
Clinical bedside assessment using consciousness scales
At present, clinical behavioural examinations permit one to
identify the above-described nosological distinctions nee-
ded for accurate diagnosis and prognosis. How do we
quantify consciousness at the bedside [32]? Consciousness
is a multifaceted concept that can be reduced into two
major dimensions: arousal (i.e., wakefulness or vigilance)
and awareness (i.e., comprising all subjective perceptions,
feelings and thoughts) [33]. Awareness, in turn, can be
divided into awareness of the external world (i.e., sensory
or perceptual awareness of the environment) and awareness
of the internal world (i.e., stimulus-independent thoughts,
mental imagery, inner speech, daydreaming or mind wan-
dering) [34]. Clinically, arousal will simply be assessed by
examining the presence of spontaneous or stimulus induced
eye-opening and the presence of reproducible command-
following will be taken as proof of (external) awareness.
Additionally, as previously discussed, the presence of
spontaneous or induced non-reflex behaviours will be
considered as evidence of (minimal) consciousness
(MCS-). The bedside examination of consciousness in
severely brain damaged patients often is very challenging
because observed movements may be very small, incon-
sistent and easily exhausted, potentially leading to diag-
nostic errors. This issue is further complicated when
patients have underlying deficits in the domain of verbal or
non-verbal communication functions, such as aphasia,
agnosia or apraxia [35, 36]. This problem was recently
highlighted in a study showing that the clinical consensus
diagnosis could be incorrect in more than 40% of patients
considered to be vegetative [18]. Locked-in syndrome
patients may also be mistakenly considered unconscious
[37, 38]. These studies should aid clinicians to use stan-
dardized validated behavioural scales of consciousness
when making a diagnosis in these challenging patients.
However, while consensus-based diagnostic guidelines for
disorders of consciousness have been established [9], there
are no procedural guidelines regarding bedside assessment.
In a recent milestone paper, the American Congress of
Rehabilitation Medicine conducted a systematic, evidence-
based review of behavioural assessment scales for disor-
ders of consciousness and provided evidence-based rec-
ommendations for clinical use founded on content validity
(i.e., enclosing diagnostic criteria), reliability, diagnostic
validity, and ability to predict functional outcomes [39].
Expert consensus-based evaluations of the included con-
sciousness scales are shown in Table 1. Interestingly, the
diagnostic validity (i.e., the scale’s ability to establish an
accurate diagnosis compared with the true diagnosis as
measured by a reference standard) was unproven for all
behavioural scales, stressing the need for future studies. In
addition to the diagnostic value of these consciousness
scales, the authors also considered their usefulness in pre-
dicting patients’ recovery of consciousness or function.
Outcome measures varied across the different reviewed
studies. The majority employed the Glasgow Outcome
Scale [40] to define the degree of recovery of severely
brain damaged patients, while others used the Rankin Scale
Score [41] or simply used a non standardized assessment.
Of interest is that most studies predicted disability levels
with death included as an outcome. The FOUR scale,
administered 24 h or sooner post-insult, was shown to be
predictive of good recovery versus disability or death at
1 month post-insult, while the GLS assessment 24 h or less
post-insult was possibly predictive of good recovery or
moderate disability versus severe disability or permanent
unresponsive/vegetative state or death at 6 months post-
insult, in line with a recent study performed in the acute
setting [42]. In conclusion, it is recommended to use the
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R summarized in
Table 2) rather than to perform an unstructured clinical
assessment [19] or coma scale such as the Glasgow Coma
Scale [44] when diagnosing disorders of consciousness
after coma.
Para-clinical neuroimaging assessment independent
of motor responses
It is important to stress that all the previously discussed
behavioural scales make inferences about patients’
(un)consciousness based on (the absence of) motor
responsiveness. In the past 15 years, functional neuroim-
aging [e.g., positron emission tomography and functional
MRI (fMRI)] and cognitive evoked potential studies have
offered the possibility to measure directly and non-inva-
sively severely brain damaged patients’ brain activity at
rest and during external activation (for review, see [58]).
More recently, however, these techniques have been
developed aiming to detect neural (motor-independent)
command following. A collaborative study between the
Cambridge and Lie`ge groups [59] showed that a clinically
vegetative patient could repeatedly and for prolonged
periods of time perform mental imagery tasks, as shown by
fMRI. When the patient was asked to imagine playing
tennis, robust activation was observed in the supplementary
motor area. The instruction to imagine moving around in
her house resulted in parahippocampal activation. These
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specific activations patterns were not different from those
previously observed in a cohort of healthy volunteers [60].
Since this case report, similar active or command following
paradigms have been tested in severely brain damaged
patients with different technologies such as fMRI, event
related potentials or electromyography. In a next step,
Monti and Vanhaudenhuyse et al. [19] employed the
technique in a larger cohort of patients and adapted the
methodology to establish fMRI-based communication. Out
of the 54 patients enrolled in the study, five patients (all
with traumatic brain injury) demonstrated willful modula-
tion of brain activity (i.e., activating supplementary motor
or parahippocampal areas, depending on the command).
Four of these five patients were admitted to the hospital
with a diagnosis of vegetative state (however, when
assessed with the CRS-R, some behavioural indicators of
consciousness could be detected in two cases). It should be
stressed that the absence of command-related brain acti-
vation (i.e., a negative result) does not allow one to make
strong claims about the absence of consciousness. Indeed,
out of the 31 MCS patients studied, only one was able to
show reliable fMRI activation in the expected brain areas
(leading to a calculated sensitivity of only 3%). Active
fMRI paradigms in patients with disorders of conscious-
ness have since been using various methodologies, asking
patients to: ‘‘look at a screen and silently name the objects
as they appear’’ (resulting in language network activation)
[20]; ‘‘move the hand’’ (resulting in premotor cortex
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Table 2 Summary of Coma Recovery Scale-Revised administration and scoring guidelines [45]
Item Description Number of observation
Auditory Function Scale
4—Consistent movement to commanda Object-related eye or limbs movement or
non-object related commands
All 4 trials of 2 different commands (8/8)
3—Reproducible movement to commanda Object-related eye or limbs movement or
non-object related commands
3/4 trials on any one of the object or non-
object related commands
2—Localization to sound Auditory stimulation (e.g. voice or noise)
from the right and the left side for 5 s.
Repeat the procedure 2 times on each
side.
Head and/or eyes orient toward the
stimulus on both trials in at least one
direction.
1—Auditory startle Auditory stimulation directly above the
patient’s head and out of view (4 trials).
Eyelid flutter or blink following the
stimulus on at least 2 trials.
0—None Observe response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Visual Function Scale
5—Object recognitiona Object-related eye or limbs movement
commands
3/4 clearly discernible responses
4—Object localization: reachinga The patient is asked to touch an object
with his/her arm or leg, 4 trials (2 left, 2
right presentations).
Movement must occur in the correct
direction on 3/4 trials.
3—Pursuit eye movementsa Move mirror 45 to the right, left, upper
and lower directions. 2 trials in every
direction (manually open eyes if
necessary).
Eyes must follow the mirror for 45
without loss of fixation on 2 occasions
in any direction.
2—Fixationb Present a brightly coloured object in front
of the patient’s face and then rapidly
move to upper, lower, right and left
visual fields for a total of 4 trials
(manually open eyes if necessary).
Eyes change from initial fixation point
and then fixate on the new target
location for more than 2 s. At least 2
fixations.
1—Visual startle Quickly move a finger 1 inch in front of
the patient’s eye, while avoiding contact
with the eyelashes or inadvertent
production of a breeze (manually open
eyes if necessary). 4 trials per eye.
Blink promptly following presentation of
visual threat on at least 2 trials with
either eye.
0—None Observe response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Motor Function Scale
6—Functional object usec Place one object (comb) in the patient’s
hand and instruct the patient to ‘‘Show
me how to use it’’. Repeat the same
instruction with a second object. 2 trials
for each object.
Movements executed are compatible with
both object’s specific function on all 4
trials.
5—Automatic motor responsea Observe for spontaneous automatic motor
behaviours (nose scratching, grasping
bedrail) during the examination.
At least 2 episodes of automatic motor
behaviour are observed within the
examination.
OR
Present a familiar gesture (e.g., wave) and
ask the patient to ‘‘Show me how to
wave’’ 2 times and ‘‘I’m going to wave
again. Do not move at all. Just hold
still’’ 2 times. (alternate each command)
Patient performs the gesture on trials
‘‘Just hold still’’.
OR
Place a spoon in front of the patient’s
mouth without making contact and ask
the patient to ‘‘Show me how to use the
spoon’’ 2 times and ‘‘I’m going to show
you a spoon. Do not move at all. Just
hold still’’ 2 times. (alternate each
command)





Item Description Number of observation
4—Object manipulationa Place a ball on the dorsal surface of the
patient’s hands and roll the ball across
the index finger and thumb without
touching the surface of the hand or
fingers. Instruct the patient to ‘‘Take the
ball’’. 4 trials
3/4 trial, the wrist must rotate and the
fingers should extend as the object is
moved along the dorsal surface of the
hand; and the object must be grasped
and held for a minimum of 5 s.
3—Localization to noxious stimulationa Apply deep pressure to nailbeds of
extremities for a minimum of 5 s. 2
trials on each side for a total of 4 trials.
The non-stimulated limb must locate and
make contact with the stimulated body
part at the point of stimulation on at
least 2/4 trials.
2—Flexion withdrawal Apply deep pressure to nailbeds of each
extremity. 1 trial per extremity.
Isolated flexion withdrawal of at least 1
limb.
1—Abnormal posturing Observe response to above method. Slow, stereotyped flexion or extension of
the extremities immediately after the
stimulation.
0—None/flaccid Observe response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Oromotor/Verbal Function Scale
3—Intelligible verbalizationa Ask the patient to answer
autobiographical or object naming
questions.
Each verbalization must consist of at least
1 consonant–vowel-consonant triad, and
2 different words must be documented,
and words produced by writing or
alphabet board are acceptable.
2—Vocalization/oral movement Non-reflexive oral movements,
spontaneous vocalizations or
vocalizations that occur during
administration of vocalization
commands.
At least 1 episode of spontaneous non-
reflexive oral movement and/or
vocalization. (Yawning is scored as
reflexive oral movement)
1—Oral reflexive movement Present tongue blade between patient’s
lips and/or teeth.
Clamping of jaws, tongue pumping, or
chewing movement.
0—None Observe response to above method. No response to any of the above.
Communication scale
2—Functional: accuratec Ask 6 visual or auditory related questions
(‘‘Am I touching my ear?’’ ‘‘Am I
clapping my hand?’’).
Clearly discernible and accurate yes/no
responses on all 6 of the visual or
auditory related questions.
1—Non-functional: intentionala Observe response to above method. Clearly discernible and accurate yes/no
responses on at least 2/6 of the visual or
auditory related questions.
0—None Observe response to above method. No discernible verbal or nonverbal
communication.
Arousal Scale
3—Attention Consistency of behavioural responses
following verbal or gestural prompts.
No more than 3 occasions across the
length of the evaluation in which the
patient fails to respond to a verbal
prompt.
2—Eye opening w/o stimulation Observe status of the eyelids across length
of assessment.
Eyes remain open across the length of the
examination without the need for any
stimulation.
1—Eye opening with stimulation See above. Tactile, pressure or noxious stimulation
must be applied at least once during the
examination in order for the patient to
sustain eye opening
0—Unarousable See above. No eye opening.
a Denotes a minimally conscious state
b Denotes a minimally conscious state except for anoxic aetiology [70]
c Denotes emergence from the minimally conscious state
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activation) [61] and imagine swimming (resulting in sup-
plementary motor area activation) [62].
Concurrently, cheaper and portable techniques using
event related potential or electromyography active para-
digms have been developed to detect possible signs of
command following not assessable by clinical behavioural
examination. Schnakers et al. [63] presented a list of names
(including their own name) and showed that nine out of 14
studied MCS patients, when instructed to count a target
name, showed an increase in amplitude of the P3 potential
(known to vary with attention) (none of the eight vegeta-
tive/unresponsive patients could do the task). This para-
digm also permitted the clinicians to detect consciousness
in a rare case of total locked-in syndrome (i.e., character-
ized by complete immobility including eye movements),
behaviourally diagnosed as comatose [43]. Others have
adapted this methodology asking patients to count the
number of deviant trials in an auditory oddball series [64]
(two out of three MCS, one LIS, but none of the four
studied vegetative/unresponsive patients could do the task).
Finally, Bekinschtein et al. [65] could show subclinical
movements by means of electromyography recordings,
when patients were asked to move their hand in two out of
eight MCS and one vegetative/unresponsive patients (all
were traumatic).
Only very recently have such active paradigms being
used to communicate with severely brain-damaged
patients. Monti and Vanhaudenhuyse et al. [19] were the
first to show fMRI based yes/no responses in a patient
clinically considered vegetative/unresponsive (i.e., diag-
nosis on admission; note that subsequent CRS-R testing
showed fluctuating behavioural signs of awareness, albeit
no capacity to communicate). The patient was asked to
answer autobiographical questions by doing motor imagery
to answer ‘‘yes’’ and visuo-spatial imagery to answer ‘‘no’’.
For five out of six questions, the patient demonstrated
reliable fMRI responses and provided correct answers. This
methodology was also used by Bardin et al. [62] who
observed reliable brain modulation and communication in
one out of three MCS patients (albeit obtaining incorrect
answers). Note that the one studied locked-in patient failed
to do the employed communication paradigm, confirming
the major limitations regarding the sensitivity of these
fMRI studies.
Table 3 offers an overview of the discussed fMRI,
evoked potential and EMG studies aiming to show signs of
consciousness and communication not accessible by bed-
side behavioural examination. The calculated sensitivity
[i.e., the proportion of actual (minimally) conscious
patients who could do the task] and specificity measures
(i.e., the proportion of allegedly unconscious patients who
failed to do the task) need to be interpreted with great
caution. The absence of functional brain activity in
response to the presented instructions can have many
possible causes, ranging from test-dependent technological
(corrupted signals due to movement or other artefacts often
encountered in these patients and especially troublesome in
fMRI experiments—e.g., see [66]) to patient-dependent
fluctuations in arousal (spontaneous or medication related),
perceptual sensory or cognitive insufficiencies (the dis-
cussed mental imagery, motor or attentional tasks indeed
require preservation of different cognitive processes such
as visual, auditory, language and working memory func-
tions). Whilst negative results do not necessarily reflect
proof of the absence of consciousness, positive results very
likely are informative and relatively easy to interpret as a
proof of consciousness.
The neurological community at present has no diag-
nostic category for patients showing only signs of con-
sciousness or communication on paraclinical fMRI or
evoked potential studies such as the ones discussed above
[19, 59]. In the presence of increasingly hard neurophysi-
ologic markers of consciousness [17], the burden of proof
for establishing consciousness in severely brain damaged
patients no longer exclusively lies in behavioural assess-
ment [67]. Clearly, patients who can ‘‘play tennis’’ and
‘‘imagine walking in their house’’ or use these complex
mental imagery tasks to accurately communicate, cannot
be considered vegetative/unresponsive or minimally con-
scious. It could be proposed to call this condition func-
tional locked-in syndrome, emphasising the dissociation
between their extreme behavioural motor dysfunction and
the identified preserved higher cognitive functions as
shown by functional imaging techniques.
What is it like to be minimally conscious or functionally
locked-in? Is consciousness in these patients with such
severely damaged brains in any ways comparable to our
own? Can they experience suffering or satisfaction? Are
these lives worth living? These questions are very hard to
answer. We cannot ask these non-communicative patients
about their self-perceived quality of life. However, we can
ask locked-in patients who are also fully dependent on
others for their daily life activities and survival. Studies
have shown that most chronic locked-in patients self-
reported good quality of life, despite their severe restric-
tions in community reintegration [71]. The longer patients
were in a locked-in state, the higher subjective well-being
seemed to be. Another recent study showed that invasive
mechanical ventilation for locked-in patients who accept
tracheotomy allowed life prolongation without affecting
quality of life [72]. Medical teams should be aware of that.
In conclusion, some patients who awaken from their
coma may fail to show any behavioural sign of awareness
(i.e., they are considered to be vegetative or—as we pre-
fer—unresponsive [11]), or they may remain unable to





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































now subdivided into MCS? (i.e., showing more complex
behaviours such as command following) and MCS- (i.e.,
showing only non-reflex movements). The clinical man-
agement of these disorders of consciousness remains very
challenging, but technological advances in neuroimaging
are now offering new ways to improve our diagnosis. It is
an exciting time as the behaviourally defined gray zones
between the different disorders of consciousness in the
clinical spectrum following coma are being challenged by
increasingly powerful imaging technology. For the first
time, neurologists may encounter rare but existing cases of
functional locked-in syndrome, where only paraclinical
tests permit one to demonstrate the presence of higher
cognitive function, inaccessible to our motor dependent
clinical evaluations. In a not so far future, real-time fMRI
based communication [68] or evoked potential brain
computer interfaces will be used to address important
clinical and ethical questions such as feeling of pain and
discomfort [69]. These novel technological means will
undoubtedly further improve the existing nosology and
clinical care of these challenging patients with disorders of
consciousness.
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